Malaysia, like any other country has experienced a number of chemical accidents in the past, hence the necessity to undertake thorough consequence analysis to mitigate similar occurrences in future. The water treatment plant in question keeps more than 18.6 MT (metric tonnes) of chlorine to disinfect water for the community in municipal area. However, chlorine is a hazardous chemical that can cause serious injuries, loss of life and damage to properties and environment if not handled properly. Hence using the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) methodology an offsite consequence analysis was conducted to determine the potential impacts in the event of catastrophic release of chlorine at the water treatment plant. A "worst-case release scenario" and "alternative scenario" were developed for the treatment plant. The results obtained from the use of TRACE software showed that a potential hazard exists, even under average annual weather conditions. Within a 6 km radius, an estimated number of 102 000 people within the zone for a 3 ppm chlorine exposure may be affected due to a worst-case release. The consequence isopleth for the respective chlorine concentration indicates that the chlorine plume is directed towards the administration building and process unit facilities of the plant. Hence, it is critical to ensure that all personnel within the plant are provided with sufficient training on the emergency response plan and the application of the relevant personnel protective equipment (PPE) in the event of accidental releases. Although the hazard exists, the risk to the public may be low. An alternative release scenario would be limited due to the use of safety and mitigation systems incorporated into the chlorinating system, but the plant requires other supporting safety measures to supplement the existing facility's inherent safety. Such measures are essential to ensure that in the event of a potential incident at the plant onsite and offsite effects could be minimised to ensure the risk is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
INTRODUCTION
Emphasis on process safety is currently being increased due to a number of serious accidents at the plant or the workplace. Accidental releases of hazardous gases during transportation, or from fixed storage installations, for instance, can give rise to toxic and/or flammable vapour clouds, constituting serious risks to both people and property [1] . In spite of the tremendous lessons learned from the Bhopal chemical accidents in 1984, accidents in industrial operations and process remain too common globally. Though a number of improvements have been observed, further research in the development of reliable mitigation devices should be sought. The problem of controlling such accidental leaks is often made worse by the fact that many hazardous gases of interest such as chlorine are heavier than air due to their high molecular weight, and lead to dense clouds [2] . Thus looking into the scenario in Malaysia, records from the Fire and Rescue Department showed that there were 398 accidents, involving the Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) team in 1999 compared to 172 accidents reported in 1990 [3] , about an 131% increase within 10 years.
In more specific accident cases in Malaysia within this period some examples are mentioned here. On 25 Thursday December 1997 at about 10:50 p.m., an explosion occurred at Shell MDS (M) Tanjong Kidurong, Bintulu, Sarawak, where more than 12 people were injured and had to be examined at the local hospital. An explosion occurred at the distillation column of the Air Separation Unit (ASU), which generated gaseous oxygen. Up to the time of the explosion, the plant was running normally in stable conditions. Debris from the explosion badly damaged facilities and buildings within the plant fence in the Malaysian LNG plant, army camp and in other nearby facilities. Major pieces of plant equipment, some weighing several tons were found 1.3 km from the epicentre of the explosion, and smaller pieces of carbon steel shrapnel were found 3.5 km away. Blast damage extended to 5 km [3] . In another incident at Kg Tudang WTP, Kuala Kerai, Kelantan on 4 July 1997 at about 11:35 p.m., chlorine gas leaked from one of the cylinders inside the chlorine room. It was observed that the leak was caused by 1-2 mm hole at the bottom of 68 kg chlorine cylinder. More than 79 people were examined at the local hospital for respiratory distress caused by chlorine exposure and 20 of them were admitted for further treatment. It is obvious therefore that quite a number of industrial and chemical accidents are still occurring even after the government gazetted the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) regulation on the 1 February 1996. This was about five years after the Bright Sparklers incident involving fireworks injuring 110 people and killing 26. These values are convincing enough to call for more efforts to enhance the safety and health standards at the Malaysian industries and workplaces in general. Thus the need to undertake this study involving a thorough consequence analysis to mitigate possible accidents at the Water Treatment Plant in Malaysia that keeps more than 18.6 MT of chlorine to disinfect water for the community in municipal area. The name of the particular plant and location as shown in Fig. 1 is omitted in this page merely for convenience. It is obvious that the quantity of chlorine stored and handled by the plant exceeded the threshold limit stipulated in the CIMAH Regulations under Schedule 2, Group 2, which thus requires the owner to submit Safety Report to the Department of Occupational Safety and health (DOSH).
The objectives of the study therefore, are to analyse and assess the hazard and consequence of an accidental chlorine gas release at the plant; as to fulfil and comply with the requirements as prescribed by the CIMAH Regulation under part 4. Also to estimate the area affected by the release of chlorine during worst-case and alternative scenarios, as prescribed by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its Risk Management Programme (RMP) offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance, 1999.
CONSEQUENCE MODELLING
The methodology used in the offsite consequence analysis to determine the extent of affected populations due to a liquid chlorine leak at the plant was based on the US EPA risk management programme and the Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance (EPA, 1999) . In the guidance, the offsite consequence analysis determines two main scenarios for chlorine leaks, viz. a worst-case scenario and the alternative release scenario. In such releases, the subsequent steps in creating an offsite consequence analysis consisted of obtaining basic mechanical chlorinating system information, estimating the rate of release, defining the distance to the level of concern of endpoint and estimating affected populations. All selected scenarios in the study were performed using the TRACE consequence analysis package by DuPont Safer System version 8.0. TRACE is believed to be a comprehensive package approved by EPA for dispersion and consequence modelling of releases. Its input is derived in a way to suit the assumptions set forth in the RMP guidance. The relevant elements are chemical properties, release scenario, meteorology, isopleth limits, receptors (optional) population distributions (optional) and obstacle density, which are detailed in the flow chart [3] presented in Fig. 2 . TRACE provided the primary database on the chemical characteristics, which were adopted in the TRACE modelling algorithm. The algorithm was then used to calculate the leak and the maximum chlorine dispersion isopleth.
Basic Information
The properties of chlorine were obtained from Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) provided by the supplier (CCM Chemicals Sdn Bhd. Malaysia). The TRACE chemical library has a database containing chemical properties for over 700 chemicals, which was fully utilized. Facility and process specific information were obtained from interviews with the plant personnel and review of the plant safety practices, which outline the plant's management of hazards associated with the use of highly hazardous substances. Process information obtained includes process flow diagram, chlorine storage capacities and a list of process safety facilities.
Worst-Case Release Scenario
The worst-case scenario was created in accordance with the required parameters for modelling, stipulated in the EPA's RMP Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance. These parameters include the methodology for determining a worst-case release scenario for extremely hazardous substances, such as chlorine. The guidance considers a worst-case release scenario as an outdoor release of the largest quantity, within 10 min of a regulated substance that results in the greatest distance from the point of release to a specific endpoint. In addition, the required parameters served as screening tools for facilities with extremely hazardous substances to estimate potential immediate impacts of worst-case release. The guidance assumes the absence of all safety and mitigation systems and the entire release of the contents of storage tank. The input parameters for TRACE analysis of the worst-case scenario are presented in Tables I and II.
Alternative Release Scenario
Alternative release scenarios were those involving equipment in use at chlorine production and/or use facilities. These scenarios were also based on the assumptions within the RMP's guidance and site-specific condition data. The assumptions made took into account the passive and active mitigation measure such as containment and scrubber systems. The most credible identified and modelled was the chlorine release through a 0.3 inch leak hole due to FIGURE 2 Typical flowchart for TRACE input elements failure of flexible tubing, which might have been caused by improper maintenance or hit by a falling object, and mitigated by the scrubber system. For this scenario, the detailed consequence analysis was carried out to determine the maximum extents over which they can have an effect, either in terms of direct fatalities or effects to adjacent facilities.
The entries for the stack model included: (1) total release rate; (2) duration of release; (3) scrubber stack release temperature; (4) height from ground level; (5) scrubber fan diameter; and (6) chemical dilution rate. These input parameters were based on the site-specific condition/data as well as the RMP's guidance. TRACE input data including the meteorology data and the stability class B was assumed per the site condition as presented in Table III . It is expedient to note that the calculated vaporization rate resulted from chlorine release from 
Notes: A, B & C correspond to unstable conditions, D neutral conditions, E & F are associated with stable conditions with F corresponding to the lowest dispersion rate. a 0.3 inch hole size, and it was the capacity of one fan. Two fans were used for the scrubber system. Assumption made was that the fans should activate upon detection of chlorine leakage at 5 ppm.
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
The results for the scenarios consequences modelled at different wind speeds of 0.3, 0.9 and 1.5 m/s for chlorine releases of 3.0, 10 and 20 ppm are presented in Fig. 3 for both worst-case and alternative releases.
Worst-Case Release Scenario
In this release case, one chlorine drum content was assumed to be released instantaneously within a timeframe of less than 10 min. At the time of the release, neither prevention nor mitigation features were employed. Thus the simulated results were shown in Fig. 3 , while Table IV contains the detail numeric values obtained from TRACE. The results showed that the maximum isopleths distance for 3, 10 and 20 ppm were about 9, 5.3 and 4 m, respectively, at a 1.5 m/s wind speed. This implied that at higher wind speed, the isopleth distance tends to disperse further relative to lower wind speed. In the instantaneous model, it was assumed that initially a cylindrical chlorine puff was formed. The direction and distance the chlorine puff would go were strongly dependent on the prevailing weather conditions at the time of release. Atmospheric condition of class B was used to model the release, which corresponds to unstable atmospheric condition. This condition relates to the warmer air during the daytime on the earth's surface that tends to rise inducing a vertical atmospheric movement and consequently, vertical instability of the atmosphere. Chlorine being a dense gas, the release height or the leak source height was assumed to be at ground level. Hence once the puff of chlorine was formed, it began to slump under the effect of gravity. Dilution within the cloud was not rapid since turbulence and atmospheric motions happen at a greater height. Furthermore, the chlorine puff was easily transported by wind due to its "heavier than air" characteristics. Thus, at a lower wind speed, the internal dilution can occur more actively and eventually diluted to the point that its density approached that of the surrounding air and it no longer behaved as a dense gas. While at higher wind speeds, the opportunity to mix quicker within the atmosphere was almost impossible, since it was continuously being carried away by the wind further, resulting in an enormous isopleth distance.
Alternative Release Scenario
This is a release scenario where chlorine was released due to a 0.3 inch leak hole either due to drum, pipe or flexible tubing failure. The scenario considered the scrubber as the active mitigation feature. However, if the scrubber system failed and the chlorine leaked, the scrubber fans would suck in the chlorine and release it via the stack without being scrubbed. The consequence modelling results ( Fig. 3) for the scrubber stack releases were quantitatively presented in Table V . The maximum distances for chlorine concentration at 3, 10, 20 ppm were about 1.4 km, 700 and 420 m, respectively, which could not be properly represented in Fig. 3 due to the contour land scale used in comparison to the worst-case release scenarios that involved much longer spill distances. This occurred at the wind speed of 0.3 m/s. However, at 0.9 and 1.5 m/s no distance was simulated at the immediately dangerous level to health (IDLH), 10 and 20 ppm levels. The distance of chlorine release does correspond to the speed of the prevailing wind where a higher wind speed will cover a smaller area of the isopleth distance. This is true as the leak was vent through a 0.3 inch hole size, which could result in a release of chlorine at 0.05 kg/s and require about 5 h to exhaust the entire drum content. Such a release is normally characterized as being continuous, releasing chlorine into the atmosphere over a long period of time ( > 10 min). A continuous release can result in a plume, which can reach an equilibrium size and concentration, while the concentration of the plume downwind, relative to instantaneous release, will be constant over the time of the release. Therefore, as the concentration of the chlorine is constant over the duration of the continuous release, the dilution will be more intense and aggressive at a higher wind speed. Furthermore, the dense chlorine gas was released at the height of the scrubber stack, promoting the mixing with air and moisture in the air due to the atmospheric stability class B during its descent to a lower level. In the process, some portion of the released chlorine will either become aerosol or fall to the ground as liquid. From the preceding discussion, it can be inferred that at 0.9 and 1.5 m/s wind speeds, the distances derived for the chlorine consequence release was negligible. This indicates that complete dilution of the chlorine occurred immediately upon release from the stack and maintained at the height before dispersing completely.
Estimate of Population Affected
Considering the meteorological circumstance, most wind throughout the year originates from the northeast (Fig. 3 ) of the plant. Thus the southwest quadrant, which is located downwind of the prevailing wind of the plant will be severely affected in the event of a chlorine release. However, referring to the modelling results for the relevant scenarios, the chlorine release isopleths for various wind speeds at different concentrations can extend beyond the boundary fence line of the plant (Fig. 1) . The population data used for this analysis was taken from recorded population census for the district where the plant is located for the year 1991; the estimated number of tourists for the year 1999 was used to assess the total tourists that could be affected at tourist attraction places. The nearest residential and other nearby populated areas are presented in Table VI .
Worst-Case Release Scenario.
Table IV had shown that the maximum distance that the chlorine releases can extend was about 9 km at wind condition 1.5 m/s for 3 ppm concentration. Thus Table VII presents the population distribution at the affected areas according to wind speeds at 3, 10 and 20 ppm. (Fig.  3) , at 3 ppm the estimated number of people to be affected was 101 588. However, for the IDLH concentration, the plume slightly encroached into District 11. Therefore, it was assumed that only half of the area population was exposed, giving a total number to about 64 107 people affected at this concentration level. For the 20 ppm level, the estimated figure was 26 626 people. While at the wind speed of 1.5 m/s, the estimated population exposed at 3 and 10 ppm was 101 588 onsite and offsite. Fig. 3 showed that the edge of the chlorine plume for a 3 ppm concentration had spread out until it reached a point 3 km off coast, because about 6 km south west of District 11 is a coast line, since the plume had extended to 9 km southwest. It also illustrated that the 10 ppm plume did not actually cover District 11 entirely. However, it was possible that a slight gust of wind may change the width of the plume. Thus the total population of District 11 was used in this approximation. As for the 20 ppm concentration, the isopleth did not reach 4 km radius. Therefore only half of the population of District 11 was taken into account. This gave a total of about 64 107 people affected.
Alternative Release Scenario.
Table VIII presents the population distribution at the affected areas according to wind speed, at 3, 10 and 20 ppm. Under the alternative scenario, a release of chlorine was not expected to go beyond the facility's perimeter. It is expected that no offsite population will be affected due to the mitigation features in place. Table VIII showed that the estimated onsite and offsite population affected at 3 ppm was 4119. At the IDLH concentration, the number of exposed population was 2679 and about 44 people were affected at 20 ppm concentration. At a wind speed of 0.9 m/s for an alternative release, the maximum isopleth distance was 300 m for a chlorine release of 3 ppm. At the IDLH limit and 20 ppm, the distance was extremely small and considered negligible. For the 3 ppm consequence contour (Fig. 3) , the possible number of people involved was the plant personnel, which comprised of about 6 people at most, during office hour. However, no offsite population would be affected at this concentration; at a wind speed of 1.5 m/s, deduced from Table VIII, the isopleth distance at the respective chlorine concentration was negligible due to the complete dilution of the release at the scrubber height. Therefore, no one was exposed to any chlorine release at the relevant concentration for this wind speed.
Inherent Safety
Kletz [6] [7] [8] proposed and formalized, an inherent safety design concept as a fundamental approach to hazard management, emphasizing the limitation of hazards at source, rather than relying on "add-on" safety features or management systems and procedures to control them [9] . Unfortunately, this plant handling chlorine in hazardous quantities has been relying on the socalled "add-on" strategies as accident protective features. However, Perry et al. [10] has referred to such measures as almost obsolete, complex, expensive and the equipment requires regular testing and maintenance, and that it often interferes with the smooth operation of the plant and is sometimes bypassed. Although the hazard to the health and safety of the public from massive chlorine leak at the water treatment plant potentially exists, the risk to the public from a catastrophic release was considered low as discussed in the preceding sections. Generally, only the populations downwind of the facility would be at risk of exposure if a release occurred red. In most cases, the people who are closest to the facility, within a half-mile radius or less would face the greatest danger if an accident occurred. Apparently at present, the chlorine facilities are equipped with the following relevant mitigation systems.
Chlorine Warning Siren.
The plant chlorine-warning siren was designed to provide a prompt audible and visible warning. The alarm will be actuated in conjunction with two separate events: (1) chlorine facilities malfunction; and (2) changeover of chlorine drums. In the first event, the siren is initiated automatically via the detection of malfunction in the chlorine facilities, such as the scrubber failure. The siren will let out a prolonged audible warning and simultaneously lights up the beacon mounted over the main entrance of the chlorine store. For the second event, the siren will only produce a short audible warning to indicate the on-line drums are nearly depleted and changeover is required.
Gas Detector/Sensors.
There are five chlorine gas sensors (Capital Control, Series 1660) provided at the chlorine building. The gas sensors are online monitoring system for the detection of chlorine in ambient air. This sensor was designed to give an early warning of chlorine. The transmitter consists of an electrochemical gas sensor and electronic amplifier. When gas is detected, the sensor transmits a gas concentration signal to a receiver module located within the building. The receiver provides a visual and audible indication, and an alarm relay changes state to activate an external warning system. Alarm contacts are provided to transfer at either user selectable or automatic set points.
Exhaust Fans.
The chlorine building is equipped with exhaust fans with a capacity of 7880 m 3 /h each. The numbers of exhaust fans at the respective areas of the building are: (1) six fans at the chlorine drum storage area; (2) two fans at the chlorine room; and (3) two fans at the switch-panel room. The exhaust fans function to ventilate the area as well as to draw out minor chlorine leakage from the area. It can either be automatically or manually activated upon alarm initiation at 3 ppm concentration. At a higher release concentration, the fans will automatically shut-off and abatement will be provided by the scrubber system.
Scrubber System.
A scrubber system was installed for the chlorine drum storage area. The chlorine adsorbing scrubber system activates upon the detection of escaping chlorine. The scrubber is capable of removing up to 99% of all particulate contaminants and up to 95% of gaseous contaminant in order to meet the Department of Environmental (DOE) air pollution control requirements. It operates by extracting chlorine gas through a series of ducts from the point of release. The exhaust fans at the chlorine storage room are shut-off to prevent chlorine escape into the atmosphere. The gas is passed through a chamber where it chemically reacts with caustic soda and water before being vented out to the atmosphere.
Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE).
Several PPE are available for the plant personnel during handling of chlorine and to use for safe evacuation in the event of chlorine release. Emergency eyewash and shower stations are provided at the plant chlorine building. The stations are placed in locations where they can be reached within 10 s should any emergency occur. Fire extinguishers are also provided at the chlorine facilities to prevent any of fire within the vicinity. In addition to the active and passive mitigation measures, the plant also has in place an onsite emergency response plan (ERP) to be activated during any chlorine emergencies. The plant addressed the necessary response actions in the event of accidental chlorine release and the relevant emergency team members, who are responsible for executing the plan.
CONCLUSIONS
Generally, results have shown that potential offsite consequences of catastrophic release of liquefied chlorine gas indicate that the hazard to the public exists. Other main conclusions from the consequence modelling are as follows:
(1) The chlorine facilities represent the most significant risk of a major accident hazard within the water treatment plant. The release of the chlorine has the potential to spread toxic gas clouds. (2) The worst-case release consequence results showed that the accidental chlorine release could extend to a distance of 9 km for 3 ppm at 1.5 m/s wind speed. Furthermore, the IDLH chlorine concentration can reach a distance of 6 km. The areas affected are towards the southeast quadrant of the plant. The estimated maximum number of population exposed was 102 000 people. With such number of offsite people involved, the development of an effective offsite emergency response procedure is essential to address the evacuation of downwind people to protect them from the potentially harmful effects of toxicity exposure. (3) Releases for the alternative scenario resulted in smaller isopleths, as opposed to the worst-case releases. This was due to the presence and use of the scrubber system as the mitigation feature within the chlorine building. The consequence modelling results showed that the scrubber system could prevent the chlorine release from affecting larger areas. (4) The consequence isopleth for the respective chlorine concentration indicated that the chlorine plume was directed towards the administrative building and process unit facilities of the plant. Hence, it is critical to ensure that all personnel within the plant are provided with sufficient training on the ERP and the application of the relevant PPE in the event of accidental releases.
In most instances, worst-case conditions do not occur and immediate emergency response could drastically reduce the effects of the release. In contrast, the likelihood of an alternative release may be greater and for variability in equipment integrating human error makes them more probable. However, the alternative release scenario is a more realistic event of what could occur under normal process conditions. Combining weather conditions expected in worst-case scenario and active mitigation systems makes this type of model a useful tool in providing qualitative measurements and evaluations of a chemical facility's inherent safety. This does not mean that such events cannot or will not happen. It is concluded therefore, that the water treatment plant may require some other supporting safety measures to supplement the existing facility's inherent safety. Such measures are essential to ensure that potential incidents at the plant that may have significant onsite and offsite effects could be reduced to ensure that the risk is ALARP. Most importantly, if practicable, a drastic reduction of chlorine inventory in the plant, as against the present the present 18.6 MT, is greatly recommended.
